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On online crowdfunding platforms, three stakeholder groups, i.e., platform operators, project found-
ers, and funders, encounter each other and influence funding outcomes by their actions and behaviors. 
Interestingly, among the successfully funded projects, some projects are heavily overfunded. By our 
research paper, we address this phenomenon of project overfunding. Especially in reward-based 
crowdfunding, massive overfunding can lead to severe problems for project founders when vast 
amounts of rewards have to be delivered. Some people even argue that the amount of money that leads 
to overfunding should better be pledged to good but undervalued projects that fail to reach their fund-
ing goal. However, it is also a powerful mean to generate publicity and to sell products. In order to 
help understanding this phenomenon, we analyze its drivers. Our analysis gives evidence for all three 
stakeholder groups contributing to overfunding. We provide arguments for all three stakeholder 
groups to have certain egoistic incentives for a further backing of already funded projects instead of 
prioritizing a more demand-oriented distribution of funding. Our findings extend the understanding of 
funding processes on crowdfunding platforms and are of high interest for practitioners in the field. 
Keywords: Crowdfunding, Online Platforms, Kickstarter, Project Overfunding, Altruism, Egoism. 
 
1 Introduction 
Online crowdfunding platforms offer both project founders and potential funders a virtual place to find 
and meet each other (Ingram et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 2014). Today, using an online platform 
for acquiring the necessary project funding is a valuable option for project founders besides traditional 
funding sources, such as banks, venture capitalists, or governmental initiatives. Crowdfunding plat-
forms offer all the relevant services around creating a project website, presenting the project online, 
and coordinating the funding payments. Another valuable advantage of such established platforms is 
that they are already well-known to a considerable number of Internet users (Etter et al., 2013). This 
means that Internet users can come across a project and, then, may decide to back it by funding. 
Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and RocketHub are well-known examples for such crowdfunding platforms. 
For project founders, it is important to know how they can support reaching the funding success of 
their crowdfunding campaigns, i.e., reaching a certain goal amount of funding. Therefore, research has 
dealt predominantly with two questions so far. First, research has investigated the reasons why funders 
pledge money to projects in order to understand the underlying intentions (e.g., Gerber et al., 2012; 
Kuo and Wu, 2014). Second, research has analyzed which factors contribute to funding success to ex-
plain how founders can design a more successful campaign (e.g., Mollick, 2014; Xiao et al., 2014; Xu 
et al., 2014; Koch and Siering, 2015). The empirical results, insights, and implications of these studies 
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help founders to plan and conduct a successful crowdfunding campaign and give valuable advice of 
how to design the project presentation in order to attract funding and reach the funding goal. 
In our opinion, an optimal crowdfunding platform supports those projects that are worth funding and 
helps to distribute the sum of potential funding in a way that respects all stakeholders' interests in the 
best way as possible. However, looking at funding results on crowdfunding platforms makes obvious 
that some campaigns' amount of pledged funding does not just reach the funding goal but massively 
exceeds this goal. That is, some projects receive a funding that is distinctly higher than their defined 
funding goal while other projects that would also be worth funding fail to reach their funding goal 
(Malave, 2012). An example of extreme overfunding that has recently reached popularity represents 
the case of the Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign "Pebble Time - Awesome Smartwatch, No Com-
promises" (conducted in march 2015), which had a targeted funding goal of USD 500.000. The final 
funding of this campaign exceeded this goal by an incredible sum of USD 19.8 million − becoming the 
highest funding that has ever been reached on Kickstarter (Hope King, 2015). 
Such extreme funding results have been discussed as potential functional weaknesses on crowdfunding 
platforms (Malave, 2012). However, overfunding can also be highly beneficial for those project 
founders that desire to generate publicity and to sell their products or services. Overfunding is also 
relevant for founders that plan a project with so-called stretched goals, e.g., a PC game that will con-
tain more game levels according to the available (over)funding. Here, the level of overfunding decides 
on how much of the additional features can be implemented. Even the platform operators themselves 
benefit from overfunded campaigns through additional traffic they generate on the platform, the indi-
rect promotion for the platform as well as higher resulting revenues. Thus, the question of how mas-
sive overfunding of some projects affects overall welfare is not easy to answer and has not yet been 
discussed intensively. Before effectively analyzing market quality, we hold it to be substantial to in-
vestigate the factors that lead to project overfunding. Therefore, by our research, we address the ques-
tion of what are the drivers of project overfunding. Although some publications refer to overfunding as 
a phenomenon of crowdfunding (Malave, 2012; Mollick, 2014; Barbi and Bigelli, 2015; Gabison, 
2015; Frydrych et al., 2014), research has not yet investigated the underlying reasons sufficiently. To 
close this research gap, we propose a research model, conduct an empirical analysis taking into ac-
count all three stakeholder groups, and discuss the drivers of project overfunding. Hereby, we reveal 
the influence of platform-, founder-, funder- as well as project-related aspects on overfunding. 
Our research paper proceeds as follows. In a first step, we review the background of and the most im-
portant research on crowdfunding as well as related theories to allow for an optimal linkage to the in-
sights of our research. Then, we characterize our data set that we have used for descriptive and empiri-
cal analyses. Next, we present our extensive analysis of project overfunding and its drivers. Herein, we 
provide a graphical pre-analysis, present our research model to explain overfunding, and evaluate this 
model using data from Kickstarter. Finally, we discuss the findings, address limitations, and conclude. 
2 Background and Related Research 
2.1 Online Crowdfunding Platforms 
Crowdfunding platforms are so-called two-sided markets that intermediate between project founders 
searching for funding and funders willing to provide money (Belleflamme et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
they can be seen as the meeting place of three stakeholder groups, i.e., platform operators, project 
founders, and project funders (Valančienė and Jegelevičiūtė, 2014; Collins and Pierrakis, 2012). On 
such platforms, project founders create a campaign website to, first, advertize their project and, se-
cond, attract and convince potential funders to back the project by their pledge of funding. Typically, 
both a funding period (e.g., 30 days) and a funding goal (e.g., USD 20,000) have to be defined initially 
by the project founders. After the initially defined period of time, the crowdfunding campaign ends 
and the amount of pledged funding determines whether the campaign reached the funding goal or not.  
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Generally, crowdfunding can be categorized into five types (Abushaban, 2014; Rossi, 2014; Schramm 
and Carstens, 2014), which are donation-based crowdfunding (where funders support projects by 
funding without claiming any compensation), reward-based crowdfunding (where funders are com-
pensated for funding by a non-monetary reward), lending-based crowdfunding [crowdlending] (where 
funders are compensated for funding by a later repayment and interest payments), equity-based 
crowdfunding [crowdinvesting] (where funders are compensated for funding by a share of equity), and 
royalty-based crowdfunding (where funders are compensated for funding by royalty payments for the 
use of a patents/licenses/etc.). According to the crowdfunding model, different outcomes of the cam-
paign are possible (Wheat et al., 2013; Gerber et al., 2012; Cumming et al., 2014): the all-or-nothing 
model allows project founders to keep the amount of pledged money only if the funding goal is 
reached and the keep-it-all model allows project founders to get the amount of pledged money in any 
case. The platform Kickstarter, for example, applies an all-or-nothing model and allows for a combi-
nation of reward-based as well as donation-based funding. Concerning platform usage costs, platform 
operators define a fee pricing structure, that determines the costs for platform users. Typically, the 
platforms keep a fixed percentage, e.g., 4 or 5 per cent, of the collected funding. 
2.2 Research on Crowdfunding Success and Overfunding 
For project founders, it is especially important to know which factors support the successful funding of 
projects. Therefore, research has analyzed successfully and unsuccessfully funded projects to deter-
mine the success factors of crowdfunding. Accordingly, it has been confirmed that the higher the fund-
ing goal, the less likely is funding success (Koch and Siering, 2015; Mollick, 2014). A more extensive 
description text of the project presentations leads to a higher probability of successful funding (Koch 
and Siering, 2015; Barbi and Bigelli, 2015; Xiao et al., 2014). Also, the usage of media, i.e., pictures 
and videos, increases the success probability (Koch and Siering, 2015; Barbi and Bigelli, 2015; Xiao 
et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014). Furthermore, it has been shown that updating the projects by posts and 
giving further information on the project stages is also supportive (Mollick, 2014; Xu et al., 2014; 
Xiao et al., 2014). Moreover, Zvilichovsky et al. (2014) find indications that a project is more likely to 
be successfully funded if its founder has backed other projects by funding before. Also, founders' ex-
perience in form of previously created crowdfunding campaigns on the platform has a significant posi-
tive influence on campaigns' success (Zvilichovsky et al., 2014; Koch and Siering, 2015). Mitra and 
Gilbert (2014) analyze the language of project descriptions and find that there are typical phrases that 
lead to projects being more likely to be successfully funded. Moreover, it has been shown that cam-
paigns with a shorter funding period are more likely to be successfully funded (Xiao et al., 2014; 
Mollick, 2014; Barbi and Bigelli, 2015). And, finally, Zheng et al. (2014) find indications that there 
are cultural differences in crowdfunding. They argue that findings for the USA need not to be neces-
sarily the same for other geographical regions. In Chinese, e.g., they find a positive influence of the 
length of funding periods on funding success − in contrast to its negative influence in the USA. 
Concerning the dynamic rise of funding, Mollick (2014) argue that an early growth of pledged funding 
leads to further funding by other funders because funding growth is seen as a signal of project quality. 
Moreover, researchers explain that social interconnection and social networks' dynamics function as 
multipliers and that communication via social networks supports funding success by spreading the 
word of mouth (Frydrych et al., 2014; Cheung et al., 2008; Hui et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, research has discussed the intentions for projects founders to use crowdfunding. Certain-
ly, founders use crowdfunding platforms to collect money (Gerber et al., 2012). But we also find other 
reasons like selling products, e.g., in a pre-selling campaign (Kuo and Wu, 2014), increasing commu-
nities' awareness and publicity (Gerber et al., 2012), establishing relationships (Gerber et al., 2012) 
and receiving support, validation as well as commitment (Gerber et al., 2012). Funders also have vari-
ous intentions to participate in crowdfunding. For example, joining a crowdfunding community can be 
driven by a positive feeling as a result of being socially connected (Gerber et al., 2012). Individuals 
pledging money to projects can be interested in the project reaching its aim (Gerber et al., 2012; 
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Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013), e.g., building a monument/memorial, or focus on receiving the prod-
uct that results from the project (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013; Gerber et al., 2012; Haas et al., 
2014), e.g., technical products, or intend to receive any other form of profit for their funding (Haas et 
al., 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013), e.g., future payments, or expect future acts of reciprocity 
from supported individuals (Zvilichovsky et al., 2014), or enjoy feeling content through helping and 
supporting others altruistically (Haas et al., 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). Therefore, it can be 
distinguished principally between motives to "enhance the welfare of the needy" (altruistic) and mo-
tives to "somehow enhance a person's own welfare" (egoistic) (Bendapudi et al., 1996). 
Among all successfully funded projects, there are some projects that exactly reach their goal while the 
funding of most projects exceeds the goal to a certain extent. Such projects are overfunded. In the lit-
erature, the term of overfunding is used in two slightly different ways. Principally, a project is called 
overfunded the moment its funding exceeds the goal (e.g., Frydrych et al., 2014). Sometimes, the term 
is especially used when a project's funding is considerably higher than its funding goal (e.g., Mollick, 
2014). However, concerning overfunding, there have been only very few research findings so far. 
Mollick (2014) finds that overfunded projects tend much more to delays in delivering the promised 
rewards. And Malave (2012), in his paper, addresses the question of how Kickstarter could better cater 
the needs of its users by redesigning and changing some platform principles and model parameters. He 
also captures the idea that lowering overfunding could help to fund undervalued projects that other-
wise fail to reach their goal. Recently, one first attempt of explaining overfunding has been made 
(Cordova et al., 2015). However, this paper suffers from several weaknesses. Many important factors, 
e.g., all founder-related aspects and all factors of project information disclosure, which already have 
been shown to be important for the explanation of funding results, have been completely disregarded. 
On the other hand, the number of funders and the logarithm of funders' average funding contribution 
have been included as explanatory variables. Obviously, these variables are highly correlated with the 
independent variable of overfunding because the sum of overfunding is the result of multiplying the 
number of funders with the mean funding contribution. Consequently, research has to adjust the model 
or to propose a different approach in order to identify the true underlying reasons for overfunding. 
2.3 Related Theories 
Whenever money or goods are exchanged, overall welfare and utility are influenced by activities and 
decisions of all individuals concerned. In the case of crowdfunding platforms, project founders, fun-
ders, and platform operators have an influence on the distribution of funding and compensations. 
While it is reasonable that individuals usually desire own optimal outcomes, it is much more difficult 
to determine when the optimal overall outcome is achieved. Especially interesting is the fact that pro-
jects are competing for funding (Burtch, 2011). The funding of a project has negative external effects 
on all other projects as these cannot receive this amount of money anymore. Such (uninternalized) ex-
ternalities can be seen as a form of market failure (Williamson, 1971). In general, crowdfunding plat-
forms are both open to the crowd and open to free funding decision making. As a result, funding out-
comes are likely to be biased by market failure and need not to reflect optimal results. 
In comparable context, Harrison and Wicks (2013) explain that overall performance cannot only be 
measured by revenues that are generated. Whenever many individuals and parties are concerned, a 
multi-stakeholder approach is necessary to measure performance and to estimate the overall utility of 
the outcome. Harrison and Wicks (2013) conclude that performance should be measured as the "total 
value created by the firm through its activities, which is the sum of the utilities created for each of a 
firm's legitimate stakeholders". Therefore, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994; Freeman et al., 2004) 
advise to regard responsibilities concerning all stakeholders whenever business is conducted or deci-
sions are made. He et al. (2014), for example, discuss stakeholder theory in the context of crowdsourc-
ing. In crowdsourcing, a task or problem is outsourced to the crowd in form of an open call that asks 
the crowd for solving the problem or completing the task (Brabham, 2008; Howe, 2006). He et al. 
(2014) demonstrate that in this crowd-based context various types of stakeholders with different spe-
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cific attributes and interests can be found. That is, for an optimal overall outcome, all different types of 
stakeholders have to be considered and respected. 
However, as long as platform rules do not ensure that all individuals contribute actively to an overall 
optimal outcome, every individual tend to maximize his or her own profits and benefits. Therefore, we 
suggest that theoretical aspects on individual behavior, decision making as well as egoism and altru-
ism yield valuable indications and implications in the context of crowdfunding. All three stakeholders 
are confronted with many questions and decisions. For example, the funders have to choose projects 
that they find interesting and worth funding but also trustworthy (Hui et al., 2014; Lehner, 2013). The 
project founders have to decide on how to present the projects and on how to set the funding period 
and funding goal (Mollick, 2014; Xu et al., 2014; Xiao et al., 2014). And the platform operators have 
to determine key parameters of the crowdfunding model or decide on how campaigns are displayed on 
the platform website. In all such decisions, altruism and egoism are important driving forces. While 
egoism leads individuals to maximize own profits, the reasons for altruistic behavior are more com-
plex (Andreoni, 1990). When explaining why individuals help others, it is often referred to the norm 
of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Leeds, 1963). Reciprocity explains 'giving' as a compensation for hav-
ing received something previously or in hope to receive something in future (Gouldner, 1960). How-
ever, apart from this explanation, research discusses other possible reasons for altruism, for example, 
friendship, respect, prestige, and social as well as psychological objectives (Olson, 2002). Concerning 
funders, we find both traces of egoism (e.g., funders focusing only on receiving the rewards) (Haas et 
al., 2014; Gerber et al., 2012) and traces of altruism (e.g., funders helping without taking rewards) 
(Haas et al., 2014). Thus, we assume that in crowdfunding especially aspects of egoism and altruism 
explain a large part of stakeholders' behavior and, thus, of funding outcomes. 
3 Analyzing Drivers of Project Overfunding 
3.1 Data set and data acquisition 
For our descriptive and empirical analyses in the following sections, we use a data set of projects from 
the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. This data set comprises successful project campaigns (i.e., pro-
jects that have reached their funding goal) as well as unsuccessful project campaigns (i.e., projects that 
have failed to reach their funding goal). We took an almost balanced data set of successful and unsuc-
cessful projects going back from the end of November 2014. In total, we have collected 40,833 pro-
jects in our data base: 19,745 successful and 21,088 unsuccessful project campaigns. 
On Kickstarter, projects are assigned to one of fifteen different categories: Art, Comics, Crafts, Dance, 
Design, Fashion, Film&Video, Food, Games, Journalism, Music, Photography, Publishing, Technolo-
gy, or Theater, which we will regard in later analyses. Moreover, on Kickstarter, projects cannot only 
be denoted in USD − but projects in USD are noticeably more frequent. For our empirical analysis of 
overfunding, we use all successfully funded projects that are denoted in USD to avoid problems of 
currency conversion. This results into a final data set of 15,824 project campaigns. 
3.2 Graphical pre-analyses 
In a first step, we apply a graphical analysis of the crowdfunding data in order to gain initial insights 
into funders' funding behavior and its relation to overfunding. We examine the distribution of the 
amount of funding that crowdfunding campaigns have reached. Therefore, we do not regard the abso-
lute amount of funding but we set the finally reached funding X into relation to the initially defined 
funding goal Xgoal of the project, so that: Rfund = X / Xgoal. For unsuccessfully funded projects, this 
funding extent Rfund ranges always in the interval of [0, 1[. Successfully funded projects always have a 
Rfund ≥ 1, while a value of Rfund = 1 means that a project has exactly reached the funding goal. We de-
fine a project to be overfunded if Rfund > 1. In other words, the higher this extent of funding Rfund of a 
successfully funded project, the stronger it is overfunded. 
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For a graphical presentation of the distribution of Rfund, we slice the continuum into intervals of the 
size of 0.05. Figure 1 shows the resulting distributions of Rfund for the fifteen categories on Kickstarter. 
The resulting typical curves' shapes are in line with the research findings of Lu et al. (2014), Mollick 
(2014), and Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2013). These authors find that there are many projects that do 
not even start reaching funding dynamics and that most projects exceed their goal by only little mar-
gins. However, these authors do not distinguish explicitly between the different categories. 
 
Figure 1. Distributions of funding extents according to categories 
Although the curves of Figure 1 (b) are relatively flat, overfunding is not a niche phenomenon. The 
finally reached funding of about 27.5% of all successfully funded projects exceed the 2-fold of the 
original funding goal (17.5% exceed the 5-fold and 5.6% even exceed the 10-fold). Admittedly, the 
two graphs in Figure 1 do not allow to have a closer look on the curve shapes of the different catego-
ries. Thus, we zoom in on the curves of the successful project campaigns and find that there are char-
acteristic differences in the distributions of Rfund of the different categories. In the graphs of                            
Figure 2, we see that project categories differ noticeably concerning their distributions of Rfund. For a 
better interpretation, we may add that the higher a curve is on the left-hand side, the less projects in a 
category are overfunded. In contrast, the higher a curve is on the right-hand side, the more projects in 
a category show higher overfunding. For example, we find that the distribution of the funding extents 
Rfund of projects in the categories of Music or Dance show a relatively high occurrence rate of low 
overfunding (Figure 2, left graph) and low occurrence of strong overfunding (Figure 2, right graph). In 
contrast, the distribution for the category of Games or Design shows a relatively low occurrence rate 
of low overfunding and a higher occurrence rate of stronger overfunding. Here, a first explanation for 
projects of Dance and Music to be less overfunded might reflect that these offer less often attractive 
rewards, while projects of the categories Games or Design more often attract reward-focused funders. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of funding extents according to categories (successfully funded projects) 
 
rel. amount of projects rel. amount of projects 
    ( 0.8 ≙ 80% ) 
funding extent [Rfund] funding extent [Rfund] 
(a) Funding Distribution of 
Unsuccessfully Funded Projects [Rfund<1] 
(many projects 
remain with          
low funding) 
(very few projects 
narrowly miss      
their funding goal) 
(growing overfunding) 
(b) Funding Distribution of 
Successfully Funded Projects [Rfund≥1] 
(a) Interval [1, 1.2] (b) Interval [1.2, 2.5] 
rel. amount of projects 
 
rel. amount of projects 
 
rel. amount of projects 
 





(c) Interval [2.5, 3.0] 
(rel. many projects with 
low overfunding) 
(rel. few projects with low overfunding) 
(rel. many projects 
with high overfunding) 
(rel. few projects with high overfunding) 
Zooming on the Funding Distribution of Successfully Funded Projects of Figure 1 (b) 
( 0.45 ≙ 45% ) 
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On Kickstarter, both donation-based and rewards-based funding is possible. Hence, the projects on the 
platform are generally funded both partially reward-based, Xrew, and partially donation-based, Xdon. 
Consequently, the total sum of funding results as X = Xrew + Xdon. On Kickstarter, it can be distin-
guished how much a project has been funded by donation and how much funding has been given to the 
project in return for a funding compensation in form of a reward. Hence, for every project, this results 
into a specific relation between both funding types, so that the share of donation-based pledging is 
Sdon = Xdon / (Xrew + Xdon) = Xdon / X, which always takes values between zero and one including these 
borders, i.e., Sdon ∈  [0, 1]. We analyzed this share of donation-based pledging Sdon of successfully 
funded projects and distinguished again between the 15 project categories on Kickstarter. By this, we 
find noticeable differences between the distributions of Sdon of the project categories. 
For graphing the distribution of Sdon, we slice the range of [0, 1] into intervals of the size of 0.05. Fig-
ure 3 shows the resulting distributions of Sdon for the fifteen categories on Kickstarter. While we have 
in total 15 categories on Kickstarter, we present these in three separate graphs, each of which shows 
five categories. On the one hand, we decided to use this separation to improve visual clarity because a 
graph with 15 curves is difficult to interpret. On the other hand, by this separation, we want to show 
that we find different characteristic shapes of the curves. We see that the project categories reveal dif-
ferent distributions of the shares of donation-based funding. For a better interpretation, we may add 
that the higher a curve's shape is on the left-hand side of the graph, the more projects with a low dona-
tion-based funding are in the respective category. In contrast, the higher a curve's shape is on the right-
hand side, the more projects with a higher donation-based funding are within the project category. 
This graphical analysis reveals that founders' funding behavior differs between project categories. 
 
Figure 3. Different donating behavior according to the project categories 
In the graph (a) of Figure 3, we find curves with a noticeable peak on the left-hand side. This means 
that in these five project categories one finds a relatively high number of projects with a very low level 
of donation-based funding. This implies that many funders of these projects decide to take a reward 
instead of giving money without a compensation, which represents a relatively more reward-focusing 
style of funding. In the graph (c), the curves show more even shapes with a relatively higher level of 
the curves on the right-hand side. The project categories in this graph include more projects with a 
higher level of donation-based funding. Thus, funding in these projects is less reward-driven. And for 
completeness, the projects in the categories of graph (b) are in between. Interestingly, by this grouping 
based on the share of donation-based funding, categories that are likely to create real products (De-
sign, Fashion, etc.) and those of arts and culture (Music, Dance, etc.) are close together. 
Analyzing the curves of the categories reveals that, interestingly, the same categories group together as 
in the analysis of the share of donation-based funding Sdon in Figure 2. This lets us conclude that a low 
level of donation-based funding comes with a lower extent of overfunding. Thus, the extent of dona-
tion-based funding Sdon helps to explain the extent of overfunding Rfund of successfully funded pro-
jects. We will verify this finding in the subsequent analyses. 
(a) Low Proportion of Donations (b) Medium Proportion of Donations 
 
(c) Higher Proportion of Donations 
 
share of donation-based funding [Sdon] share of donation-based funding [Sdon] 
( 0.3 ≙ 30% ) 
(rel. many 
projects with 
a low proportion 
of donation-  
based funding) 
(rel. many projects 




rel. amount of projects 
 
rel. amount of projects 
 
rel. amount of projects 
 
share of donation-based funding [Sdon] 
 
low low low high high high 
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Our research aims at analyzing the drivers of project overfunding. Therefore, we hypothesize on the 
variables in our model as well as discuss their expected influence on projects' levels of overfunding. 
For clarity and a better overview, we have decided to form five groups of hypotheses (Figure 4). 
Campaign Conditions: Research has shown that the funding goal is an important factor in explaining 
funding success (Koch and Siering, 2015; Mollick, 2014): the higher the funding goal, the less likely 
the campaign reaches its goal. We assume a similar effect on overfunding: 
   H1.1: The funding goal has a negative influence on project overfunding. 
Concerning the duration of the campaigns, research has shown different results regarding its influence 
on funding success (Zheng et al., 2014). However, the vast majority of research finds that projects that 
successfully reach the funding goal have a shorter funding period (Mollick, 2014; Kuppuswamy and 
Bayus, 2013). Mollick (2014) explains that longer funding periods are interpreted as an indication of a 
lack of confidence among project founders. This leads to funders being more reluctant in funding. 
Hence, we assume a similar negative connection between funding duration and overfunding. 
   H1.2: The longer the funding duration, the less strong is the overfunding. 
We also include aspects on campaigns' offered rewards, which function as funding compensations. We 
assume that a higher number of reward levels, i.e., a broader range of choice, will increase overfund-
ing because more funders will find an appropriate compensation for their funding. Similar findings 
have been made in the context of funding success. Here, a broader range of choice has a positive influ-
ence on funding success (Crosetto and Regner, 2014; Barbi and Bigelli, 2015). However, the project 
founders have the possibility to limit each reward level to a certain maximum number of funders. In 
this case, only a pre-defined number of funders can select a certain reward. Therefore, we conclude 
that reward level limitations have a negative influence on overfunding. 
   H1.3: The more reward level are offered, the stronger is the overfunding. 
   H1.4: The use of reward level limitations inhibits project overfunding. 
Project Information Disclosure: It has been shown that the length of project descriptions (Xiao et al., 
2014; Koch and Siering, 2015), the number of pictures (Koch and Siering, 2015), and the provision of 
video material (Mollick, 2014; Koch and Siering, 2015; Xiao et al., 2014) have a positive influence on 
funding success. These factors lower information asymmetry between project founders and potential 
funders, which leads to more trust and a higher willingness to fund. Hence, we assume these factors to 
have a positive influence on overfunding because more funders will choose to fund. Moreover, it has 
been found that communication, e.g., by updates and comments on the crowdfunding project website, 
are positively related to funding success (Xiao et al., 2014). We are aware of the fact that comments 
do not only contain further information supplied by the project founder but a big part of these com-
ments is also submitted by other platform users. However, we hold such communication to be a proxy 
for communication activities among potential funders in the community. Such communication could 
possibly recruit further funders. Therefore, we assume communication to increase overfunding. 
   H2.1: Textual information has a positive influence on overfunding. 
   H2.2: Media-based information has a positive influence on overfunding.  
   H2.3: The more communication, the stronger is the overfunding. 
Founder-Related Aspects: Research has also analyzed the influence of founder-related aspects on 
funding success. Here, it has been found that the length of platform membership (Zvilichovsky et al., 
2014), the number of friends (Mollick, 2014; Koch and Siering, 2015), the number of backed projects 
(Zvilichovsky et al., 2014), and the experience in form of previously founded projects (Koch and 
Siering, 2015; Zvilichovsky et al., 2014) positively influence funding success. We expect these varia-
bles to have similar effects of on project overfunding. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
   H3.1: The longer the founder is active on the platform, the stronger is the overfunding. 
   H3.2: The number of friends has a positive influence on overfunding.  
   H3.3: The more active the founder is on the platform, the stronger is the overfunding.  
   H3.4: The more project campaigns a founder has conducted, the stronger is the overfunding. 
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Platform-Related Aspects: Platform operators especially benefit from projects that are characterized 
by a relatively fast growing sum of pledged money (Agrawal et al., 2013). Thus, operators principally 
have an incentive to support fast-growing projects, e.g., by placing them in a prominent position on the 
website. Such a prominent placement promotes further funding (Do et al., 2012) and increases plat-
form's revenue. Especially in the all-or-nothing model, platform operators are incentivized to place 
promising projects prominently on websites. Here, projects that to do not reach the goal do not receive 
the funding, which means no revenue for the platform. This is no general suspicion of platforms to 
influence funding results but should emphasize that platforms are theoretically able to use their impact 
to influence funding results. Not only by positioning projects on the website in a certain manner but 
also by marking the projects, for example, by labels implying that projects are "especially worth fund-
ing". Research has shown that recommendations on online platforms positively influence users' deci-
sion behavior (Senecal and Nantel, 2004). To show that such labels can further support overfunding, 
we include the so-called "staff pick" label on Kickstarter. Projects with such a label are funded by staff 
members of the Kickstarter team. We assume that such labels increase the awareness of potential fun-
ders towards the projects. Thus, we hypothesize that such labels drive overfunding. 
   H4.1: The platform is able to drive overfunding by indication of project quality. 
Funding Behavior: On crowdfunding platforms, e.g., on Kickstarter, projects offer various rewards to 
the crowd as a compensation for funding. We expect that reward-focused funders tend to continue 
funding after the goal has been reached for the purpose of gaining personal benefits from the rewards. 
Here, funders predominantly focus on receiving the rewards instead of giving priority to helping pro-
jects reach their funding goal (Gerber et al., 2012). Such funders, who thereby show traces of egoistic 
behavior, tend to continue funding although the funding goal of a campaign has already been reached. 
On the contrary, there exist funders that fund projects for more altruistic reasons (Haas et al., 2014). 
These funders prioritize helping projects to reach their funding goal. Consequently, they do not greatly 
continue funding when the funding goal is reached. Therefore, we expect projects that attract relatively 
more donation-based funding to reveal less overfunding, while projects that attract relatively more 
reward-based funding will reveal stronger overfunding. Moreover, we assume differences in funding 
behavior between project categories. Specifically, we argue that different topics appeal different kinds 
of people. People that are interested in consumption (of, e.g., technological products and fashion) are 
more likely to purchase rewards than people that are interested in arts or culture who might focus more 
on a project to reach its aim. As a result, projects of certain categories tend to higher overfunding. 
   H5.1: Funders cause a lower overfunding, if a project is more attractive for donations. 
   H5.2: There are typical project categories, the projects of which tend to more overfunding. 
3.4 Research Model 
 











[ Rfund ] 
H2.1: textual information (+) 
H2.2: media-based information (+) 
H2.3: communication (+) 
 
H1.1: funding goal (–) 
H1.2: funding duration (–) 
H1.3: reward levels (+) 
H1.4: reward level limitations (–) 
 
H3.1: time on platform (+) 
H3.2: number of friends (+) 
H3.3: active backing (+) 
H3.4: campaign experience (+) 
H4.1: indication of quality (+) 
 
H5.1: donation attraction (+) 
H5.2: project categories (+/–) 
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In the resulting research model (Figure 4), multiple variables are included to explain the level of over-
funding of online crowdfunding projects. As we have discussed in section 2.2, research in the area of 
crowdfunding has revealed several variables to have an influence on the success of funding. Thus, we 
regard an inclusion of these variables into the research model of explaining overfunding to be vital. 
These variables form the first three groups of hypotheses, i.e., regarding campaign conditions, project 
information disclosure, and founder-related aspects. Moreover, by our research model, we extend the 
set of already well-established variables by including aspects concerning the platform operators' influ-
ence on overfunding, i.e., platform-related aspects, as well as funding behavior. The latter is included 
as a result of our graphical pre-analysis, which gives indication of a relation between the extent of do-
nation-based funding and overfunding. In conformity with subsection 3.2, we measure overfunding as 
the fraction of the collected funding of a campaign in relation to a campaign's funding goal ( Rfund ). 
3.5 Operationalization 
The variables used in our regression are as follows: Goal is the funding goal in USD, Duration is the 
funding duration of the campaign in days (funding period), RewardLevels is the number of offered 
reward levels, RewardLimits is the relative amount of limited reward levels among a project's reward 
levels, FullLimits is the relative amount of reward levels that reach their limit, WordsDescription is the 
number of words of the project description, Pictures is the number of all pictures and graphical ele-
ments, TitleVideo (Boolean) indicates the existence of a title video, Updates is the number of update 
messages, Comments is the number of comments, TimeOnPlatform is the length of founder's platform 
membership in days, BackedProjects is the number of projects that the founder has backed by funding, 
CreatedProjects is the number of the founder's previously created campaigns on the platform, 
FriendsDisplyed (Boolean) indicates whether Facebook friends are displayed or not, Friends is the 
number of founder's Facebook friends (zero if not displayed), StaffPickLabel (Boolean) indicates the 
existence of a visible label revealing a staff-picked project, DonationAttraction is the relative amount 
of donation-based funding, and Cati (Boolean) the project category assignment. 
Taking a look at the data reveals that the value levels differ substantially between the variables. There-
fore, we decide to calculate the z-scores of all variables by normalization (except for Booleans). This 
has no influence on the quality of results (e.g., coefficient signs) or the coefficient of determination but 
surely on the regression coefficients. Thus, the calculated regression coefficients are brought on the 
same level and made more comparable. The z-score of a variable is calculated by subtracting its mean 
and, then, dividing by its standard deviation. Next, we present the results of our regressions. 
3.6 Empirical Analysis 
In an initial setup, we regressed the dependent variable Rfund on the set of independent variables by 
means of a linear regression in order to evaluate the research model. This regression resulted in a poor 
coefficient of determination ( R
2
 ) and surprisingly few significances. However, from our pre-analysis, 
we know that the distribution of the dependent variable Rfund is not normal but highly skewed. The 
data set involves many values close to the value of one but also values that are substantially higher. 
Such wide range of values and high skewness can lead to regressions being sensitive to outliers 
(Wooldridge, 2013). This problem is already well known in different contexts, e.g., in the analysis of 
return rates or housing prices. Wooldridge (2013) addresses this issue and suggests that "using a trans-
formation, especially taking the log, yields a distribution that is closer to normal". We followed this 
advise and regressed ln( Rfund ) on the independent variables and found both significances and a satis-
fying coefficient of determination. In detail, we apply the following set up (Model 7): 
    
(1) 
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The evaluation of our research model reveals several significant influences of the included variables 
on project overfunding. The regressions clearly show which factors drive or inhibit overfunding. 
Moreover, we run in total seven different regression set ups (Model 1 to 8) in order to examine how 
good the variables can explain overfunding (coefficient of determination). In the course of our evalua-
tion, we have checked the correlations between the variables and find that all correlations are below 
0.56. We also checked the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and found that all factors are below 2.9 
which indicates no problematic multicollinearity effects between the variables (Wooldridge, 2013). 
 
Table 1. Regression results (coefficient, p-value, significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
Remark: Every project is assigned to a project category (e.g., Art, Comics, etc.). Each of these categorical variables can be 
composed by linear combination of all other categorical variables. Therefore, variable Cat_1 is omitted to avoid collinearity. 
Campaign Conditions: The funding goal of a campaign is negatively related to overfunding (H1.1: 
p-val. < 0.01). This supports the – more or less obvious – hypothesis that a higher funding goal leads 
to a lower overfunding. This finding is in line with the research literature on crowdfunding success. 
However, previous research has shown that the duration of the campaign is negatively correlated to 
funding success (Mollick, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013). Interestingly, the duration of a 
crowdfunding campaign has no negative influence on overfunding (H1.2: not supported). In our analy-
sis, we find that a longer funding period of successfully funded campaigns leads to stronger overfund-
ing (p-val. < 0.05). We conclude that – in case of successful campaigns – longer funding periods are 
not interpreted as a signal of bad quality or as lack of confidence among project founders. Instead, the 
longer a campaign is open to be backed by funding, the more funders can use their opportunity to fund 
the project. Overfunding is also higher, the broader rewards' range of choice (H1.3: p-val. < 0.01). 
This is in line with the literature on funding success (Crosetto and Regner, 2014; Barbi and Bigelli, 
2015). On the contrary, it is shown that limiting reward levels inhibits overfunding of projects (H1.4: 
p-val. < 0.01) because reward limitations prevent rewards from being massively selected by funders. 
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Project Information Disclosure: Research has shown that a good description of projects by informa-
tive texts, pictures, and videos reduce funders' uncertainty and foster trust towards project founders 
(Koch and Siering, 2015). Our analysis reveals these hypotheses to be also valid for overfunding. The 
longer the project descriptions (H2.1: p-val. < 0.01) and the more pictures (H2.2: p-val. < 0.01), the 
higher is project overfunding. Also the existence of a title video has a positive influence on overfund-
ing (H2.2: p-val. < 0.01). These results indicate that the more information is provided, the more fun-
ders decide to fund the project. Also communication (i.e., updates and comments) has a positive influ-
ence on overfunding (H2.3: p-val. < 0.01). In our opinion, such communication can drive overfunding 
in multiple ways. First, information on project progress can be provided by the founders, which gener-
ates trust and lowers funding hesitation. Second, communication is pivotal in online communities. Po-
tential funders feel involved when there is an active community around the project. Furthermore, the 
number of comments represents the activeness of projects' community. Such activity drives the elec-
tronic word of mouth that can activate new potential funders via social media. And, third, the messag-
es can be posted in a style that requests the crowd to continue funding, e.g., in case of stretched goals. 
Founder-Related Aspects: It has already been shown that founder-related aspects have an influence 
on funding success (Mollick, 2014; Koch and Siering, 2015; Zvilichovsky et al., 2014). Our analysis 
reveals that such aspects also have an influence on the level of overfunding. Here, we find that the 
length of founders' platform membership has a positive influence on overfunding (H3.1: 
p-val. < 0.01). We explain this result by a positive relation between the length of membership and a 
higher degree of connectedness to other platform members. Moreover, the longer a founder is active 
on the platform, the easier people develop trust towards him/her. Concerning the number of Facebook 
friends, research has found that a higher number of friends has a positive influence on funding success. 
In our analysis, we also find that the number of friends positively influence overfunding (H3.2: 
p-val. < 0.01). However, the coefficient of displaying the number of friends is negative (p-val. < 0.01). 
This means that displaying a low number of friends inhibits overfunding while hiding this low number 
of friends leads to higher overfunding. Comparable results have been found in the context of funding 
success (Mollick, 2014). 
Platform-Related Aspects: The influence of crowdfunding platforms on funding processes has not 
yet been addressed substantially in research. We hold it to be vital to regard the possible influence that 
the platform can have on the funding results. Here, our analysis reveals a positive influence of indica-
tion of quality on overfunding (H4.1: p-val. < 0.01). This finding suggests the possibility that platform 
operators can selectively push projects' funding forward. 
Funding Behavior: Concerning funding behavior, we find that projects that are funded more altruisti-
cally, i.e., projects that attract relatively more donation-based funding instead of reward-based fund-
ing, have a lower overfunding. The higher the extent of donation-based funding of a project, the lower 
is the overfunding (H5.1: p-val. < 0.01). In other words, the more a project attracts reward-based fund-
ing, the more it is overfunded. Moreover, we find certain categories of projects (e.g., Technology, De-
sign, Games) that are significantly more overfunded (H5.2: p-val. < 0.01). We assume that especially 
here funders are keen on the project items or follow pre-selling campaigns. 
3.7 Discussion and Limitations 
The results presented give evidence that several factors contribute to overfunding. These findings are, 
for example, interesting for project founders who favor a higher overfunding because they intend to 
gain publicity and sell products or have planned stretched goals. These founders can increase over-
funding by regarding the findings of this study. Projects tend to be more overfunded if founders offer 
more levels of rewards, provide more information (in form of texts, pictures, and videos), communi-
cate actively, and reveal a high numbers of friends, of other backed campaigns, and of created pro-
jects. Secondly, the platform can influence funding results by their actions. If a project campaign 
promise to contribute substantially to platform's revenue by its powerful funding growth, the platform 
could place this project more prominently on the websites or indicate quality by labels to further sup-
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port it's overfunding. In contrast, operators can also decide to support especially those projects that 
have not yet reached their funding goal but are worth funding. Such a concept could help more pro-
jects to reach the funding goal but would inhibit publicity generation and product selling. Third, while 
funders that focus on rewards tend to increase overfunding, altruistic motives lead to less overfunding. 
This result can be explained by funders reacting to very inviting rewards. The more attractive the re-
wards are, the more the funders try to profit from the rewards and continue funding in order to get the 
rewards – although the campaign might already has reached its funding goal. Reward-focusing funders 
do not solely intend to help funding the project but also wish to profit and benefit from offered re-
wards. This can be interpreted as a more egoistic behavior in contrast to altruistic behavior of funders 
donating to campaigns. For projects that invite relatively more altruistic funders, the opposite is found: 
the more a project is funded altruistically, the less it tends to overfundedness. This let us conclude that 
altruistic funders especially feel good in helping projects to reach their funding goal. The moment pro-
jects have reached their goal, altruistic founders feel less emotionally satisfied when funding. If a pro-
ject is already funded, altruistic funders do not longer strongly contribute to further (over-)funding. In 
this case, the altruistic founder might search for another project that needs support to reach its goal. 
Our empirical findings are, of course, limited to the available data and the platform analyzed. Howev-
er, we argue that stakeholders contribute to overfunding similarly on other crowdfunding platforms in 
a comparable cultural context. As we only regard project that are denoted in USD, further research is 
needed to investigate potential cultural differences. Second, in our analysis, the influence of platforms 
is only represented by labels that indicate project quality. Here, other possible influences could be 
considered, e.g., the position of projects in the listings and overview pages on the platform. 
4 Conclusion 
Although project overfunding is known as a phenomenon, there has not yet been profound scientific 
discussion focusing on the question of which factors drive overfunding of projects on online crowd-
funding platforms. By our analysis, we close this research gap and show that campaign conditions, 
project information disclosure, founder-related, and platform-related aspects as well as funding behav-
ior contribute to an explanation of project overfunding. We find indication that stakeholders' egoistic 
behavior is a natural driver of project overfunding. For example, some project founders try to reach a 
higher overfunding intentionally. Some funders focus on rewards and drive overfunding by continuing 
to fund in order to receive these rewards. Platform operators might favor a higher revenue generated 
through overfunding. In contrast, altruistically motivated funders seem to be satisfied most if their 
funding contribution helps a project to reach its goal instead of contributing to further overfunding. 
Our findings extend the knowledge on funding behavior in the area of online crowdfunding and are of 
high importance for practitioners as well. The results are, for example, of high interest for project 
founders who aim at the generation of publicity or a successful pre-selling campaign and, thus, wel-
come overfunding. Moreover, our findings help to better understand the funding processes and fund-
ing outcomes on crowdfunding platforms. However, so far, it is not clear when crowdfunding reaches 
optimal outcomes for all stakeholders concerned because crowdfunding platforms are used for com-
pletely different purposes by its stakeholders. For example, platform operators either focus on revenue 
or help campaigns altruistically without aiming at maximizing own benefits; funders either focus on 
rewards that are offered or prioritize backing campaigns to help them reaching their funding goal; and 
project founders either aim at completing (e.g., social or cultural) projects or at using crowdfunding as 
a distribution channel for their products or as an advertizing initiative. As a result, it is difficult to an-
swer the question of how the best overall utility of crowdfunding can be achieved. We encourage dis-
cussion on how crowdfunding platforms optimally serve all its participants and how overall utility can 
be optimized. Particularly interesting would be an answer to the question of whether pre-selling and 
advertizing campaigns adversely affect, for example, cultural, social, and hobby projects, by a massive 
absorption of funding. We invite research to examine the quality of funding outcomes on 
crowdfunding platforms taking into account all stakeholders' interests and purposes. 
Koch /Crowdfunding Project Overfunding 
 
 




Abushaban, R. M. (2014). "Crowdfunding as a Catapult for Innovation in the Middle East: Obstacles 
and Possibilities." In: Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Confer-
ence (GHTC'14). San Jose/Silicon Valley (CA): USA. 
Agrawal, A. K., Catalini, C. and A. Goldfarb (2013). "Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding." 
Working Paper Version: 03/2013. 
Andreoni, J. (1990). "Impure Altruism and Donation to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giv-
ing." The Economic Journal 100 (401), 464–477. 
Barbi, M. and M. Bigelli (2015). "Crowdfunding Practices in and outside the US." Working Paper 
Version: 03/12/2015. 
Belleflamme, P., Lambert, T. and A. Schwienbacher (2014). "Crowdfunding: Tapping the right 
crowd." Journal of Business Venturing 29 (5), 585–609. 
Bendapudi, N., Singh, S. N. and V. Bendapudi (1996). "Enhancing Helping Behavior: An Integrative 
Framework for Promotion Planning." Journal of Marketing (3), 33–49. 
Brabham, D. C. (2008). "Crowdsourcing as a Model for Problem Solving: An Introduction and Cases." 
Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 14 (1), 75–90. 
Burtch, G. (2011). "Herding Behavior as a Network Externality." In: Proceedings of the Thirty Second 
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS'11). Shanghai: China. 
Cheung, C. M., Lee, M. K. and N. Rabjohn (2008). "The impact of electronic word‐of‐mouth: The 
adoption of online opinions in online customer communities." Internet Research 18 (3), 229–247. 
Collins, L. and Y. Pierrakis (2012). "The Venture Crowd: Crowdfunding equity investment into busi-
ness." Nesta White Paper Version: 07/2012. 
Cordova, A., Dolci, J. and G. Gianfrate (2015). "The Determinants of Crowdfunding Suc-
cess: Evidence from Technology Projects." Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 181, 115–
124. 
Crosetto, P. and T. Regner (2014). "Crowdfunding: Determinants of success and funding dynamics." 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2014-035. 
Cumming, D. J., Leboeuf, G. and A. Schwienbacher (2014). "Crowdfunding Models: Keep-it-All vs. 
All-or-Nothing." Working Paper Version: 09/27/2014. 
Do, H., Jeon, S., Banker, R., Lee, B. and B. Yoo. (2012). "Is the Leaderboard Information Useful to 
Investors?: The Leaderboard Effect in P2P Lending." In: Proceedings of the Thirty Third Interna-
tional Conference on Information Systems. Orlando (FL): USA. 
Etter, V., Grossglauser, M. and P. Thiran. (2013). "Launch Hard or Go Home!" In: Proceedings of the 
first ACM conference on Online social networks (COSN'13). Boston (MA): USA. 
Freeman, R. E. (1994). "The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions." Business Ethics 
Quarterly 4 (4), 409–421. 
Freeman, R. E., Wicks, A. C. and B. Parmar (2004). "Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objec-
tive Revisited”." Organization Science 15 (3), 364–369. 
Frydrych, D., Bock, A. J. and T. Kinder (2014). "Exploring Entrepreneurial Legitimacy in Reward-
Based Crowdfunding." Working Paper. 
Koch /Crowdfunding Project Overfunding 
 
 
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 15 
 
 
Gabison, G. A. (2015). "Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated But Not Equal." Working Paper Ver-
sion: 01/2015. 
Gerber, E. M., Hui, J. S. and P.-Y. Kuo. (2012). "Crowdfunding: Why People Are Motivated to Post 
and Fund Projects on Crowdfunding Platforms." In: Workshop of the fifteenth ACM conference on 
Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing (CSCW'12): International Work-
shop on Design, Influence, and Social Technologies: Techniques, Impacts and Ethics. Seattle 
(WA): USA. 
Gouldner, A. W. (1960). "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement." American Sociological 
Review 25 (2), 161–178. 
Haas, P., Blohm, I. and J. Marco Leimeister. (2014). "An Empirical Taxonomy of Crowdfunding In-
termediaries." In: Proceedings of the Thirty Fifth International Conference on Information Systems 
(ICIS'14). Auckland: New Zealand. 
Harrison, J. S. and A. C. Wicks (2013). "Stakeholder Theory, Value, and Firm Performance." Business 
Ethics Quarterly 23 (1), 97–124. 
He, H. R., Kotlarsky, J. and R. Gholami. (2014). "Towards Understanding IT Value Co-creation in 
Crowdsourcing: the Multiple Stakeholders' Perspective." In: Proceedings of the Thirty Fifth Inter-
national Conference on Information Systems (ICIS'14). Auckland: New Zealand. 
Hope King, L. (2015). "Pebble Time Kickstarter project raised $20.3 million.". URL: 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/27/technology/pebble-time-most-funded-kickstarter/ (visited on 
04/29/15). 
Howe, J. (2006). "Crowdsourcing: A Definition.". URL: http://crowdsourcing.typepad.com/cs/2006 
/06/crowdsourcing_a.html (visited on 04/28/15). 
Hui, J. S., Greenberg, M. D. and E. M. Gerber. (2014). "Understanding the role of community in 
crowdfunding work." In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer supported coop-
erative work & social computing (CSCW'14). Baltimore (MD): USA. 
Ingram, C., Teigland, R. and E. Vaast. (2014). "Solving the Puzzle of Crowdfunding: Where Technol-
ogy Affordances and Institutional Entrepreneurship Collide." In: Proceedings of the 47th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Science (HICSS'14). Waikoloa (HI): USA. 
Koch, J.-A. and M. Siering. (2015). "Crowdfunding Success Factors: The Characteristics of Success-
fully Funded Projects on Crowdfunding Platforms." In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Third European 
Conference on Information Systems (ECIS'15). Münster: Germany. 
Kuo, Y.-F. and C.-H. Wu. (2014). "Understanding the Drivers of Sponsors' Intentions in Online 
Crowdfunding." In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Advances in Mobile 
Computing and Multimedia (MoMM'14). Ed. by S.-L. L. Wang, Y.-H. Tao, L. Chen and C.-N. Lee. 
Kaohsiung: Taiwan. 
Kuppuswamy, V. and B. L. Bayus (2013). "Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: The Dynamics of Project 
Backers in Kickstarter." Working Paper Version: 03/16/2013. 
Leeds, R. (1963). "Altruism and the Norm of Giving." Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and De-
velopment 9 (3), 229–240. 
Lehner, O. M. (2013). "Crowdfunding social ventures: a model and research agenda." Venture Capital 
15 (4), 289–311. 
Lu, C.-T., Xie, S., Kong, X. and P. S. Yu. (2014). "Inferring the Impacts of Social Media on 
Crowdfunding." In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM international conference of Web Search and Data 
Mining (WSDM’14). New York (NY): USA. 
Koch /Crowdfunding Project Overfunding 
 
 
Twenty-Fourth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), İstanbul,Turkey, 2016 16 
 
 
Malave, I. (2012). "Why Kickstarter Should More Fully Integrate Social Media." Working Paper Ver-
sion: 11/2012. 
Mitra, T. and E. Gilbert. (2014). "The Language that Gets People to Give: Phrases that Predict Success 
on Kickstarter." In: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer supported cooperative 
work & social computing (CSCW'14). Baltimore (MD): USA. 
Mollick, E. (2014). "The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study." Journal of Business Ven-
turing 29 (1), 1–16. 
Olson, M. (2002). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cam-
bridge (MA), USA: Harvard University Press. 
Rossi, M. (2014). "The New Ways to Raise Capital: An Exploratory Study of Crowdfunding." Inter-
national Journal of Financial Research 5 (2), 8–18. 
Schramm, D. M. and J. Carstens. (2014). Startup-Crowdfunding and Crowdinvesting: Ein Guide für 
Gründer: Mit Kapital aus der Crowd junge Unternehmen finanzieren. Wiesbaden, Germany: 
Springer Gabler. 
Senecal, S. and J. Nantel (2004). "The influence of online product recommendations on consumers’ 
online choices." Journal of Retailing (2), 159–169. 
Valančienė, L. and S. Jegelevičiūtė (2014). "Crowdfunding for creating value: stakeholder approach." 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 156, 599–604. 
Wheat, R. E., Wang, Y., Byrnes, J. E. and J. Ranganathan (2013). "Raising money for scientific re-
search through crowdfunding." Trends in Ecology & Evolution 28 (2), 71–72. 
Williamson, O. E. (1971). "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations." 
The American Economic Review 61 (2), 112–123. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2013). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 5th Edition. Mason, OH, 
USA: South-Western, Cengage Learning. 
Xiao, S., Tan, X., Dong, M. and J. Qi. (2014). "How to Design Your Project in the Online 
Crowdfunding Market? Evidence from Kickstarter." In: Proceedings of the Thirty Fifth Interna-
tional Conference on Information Systems (ICIS'14). Auckland: New Zealand. 
Xu, A., Yang, X., Rao, H., Fu, W.-T., Huang, S.-W. and B. P. Bailey. (2014). "Show me the money!" 
In: Proceedings of the 32nd ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI'14). 
Toronto: Canada. 
Zheng, H., Li, D., Wu, J. and Y. Xu (2014). "The role of multidimensional social capital in 
crowdfunding: A comparative study in China and US." Information & Management 51 (4), 488–
496. 
Zvilichovsky, D., Inbar, Y. and O. Barzilay (2014). "Playing Both Sides of the Market: Success and 
Reciprocity on Crowdfunding Platforms." Working Paper Version: 09/2014. 
